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Abstract
Terrorist attacks often dominate news coverage as reporters seek to provide the public
with information. Yet, not all incidents receive equal attention. Why do some terrorist
attacks receive more media coverage than others? We argue that perpetrator religion is
the largest predictor of news coverage, while target type, being arrested, and fatalities
will also impact coverage. We examined news coverage from LexisNexis Academic and
CNN.com for all terrorist attacks in the United States between 2006 and 2015 (N=136).
Controlling for target type, fatalities, and being arrested, attacks by Muslim perpetrators
received, on average, 357% more coverage than other attacks. Our results are robust
against a number of counterarguments. The disparities in news coverage of attacks
based on the perpetrator’s religion may explain why members of the public tend to fear
the “Muslim terrorist” while ignoring other threats. More representative coverage could
help to bring public perception in line with reality.

Keywords:
terrorism; media; news coverage

Introduction
On February 6, 2017, President Trump stated that media neglect to report some
terrorist attacks.4 His administration released a list of purportedly underreported attacks.
The list included attacks that occurred in many countries and the perpetrators were
overwhelmingly Muslim. Reporters and academics were quick to dismiss President
Trump’s claim and demonstrate that these attacks were covered, often extensively.5 As
we will show here, it turns out that President Trump was correct: media do not cover
some terrorist attacks at all, while others receive disproportionate coverage. This project
addresses the question: Why do some terrorist attacks6 receive more media coverage
than others?
Media are naturally drawn to covering ongoing or potential conflicts, especially
those which are shocking or sensational (Tuman, 2010). Research has demonstrated
that terrorism is most effective at spreading fear when given widespread media
coverage (Powell, 2011). Most research on media coverage of terrorism has focused on
framing and its impact on public opinion (Norris, Kern & Jost, 2003; Powell, 2011;
Ruigrok & Attevelt, 2007). While framing impacts perceptions, the underlying
assumption here is that coverage exists in the first place. A few studies have focused on
the quantity of media coverage rather than the context. From this small body of
research, it is clear that incident-level factors can impact the amount of media coverage
that terrorist attacks receive (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Nacos, 2002; Persson,
2004). Weimann and Brosius (1991) also found that perpetrator nationality impacts the
amount of media coverage that international terrorist attacks receive. Yet, these works
are largely focused on the pre-9/11, pre-digital media age factors that may impact the
extent and nature of coverage disparities. Additionally, these studies do not focus on
perpetrator religion as a key predictor of coverage in the context of domestic terrorism.
The amount of coverage that an incident receives increases public awareness,
while signifying that the event is worthy of public attention. Media frames matter, but can
only have influence if they reach an audience. To understand the reach of coverage, we
must examine how much media covers terrorist attacks in addition to examining how
terrorism is covered. The present study addresses two gaps in the literature: 1) factors
that explain differences in the quantity of media coverage that terrorist attacks receive
post-9/11 and in the digital media age, and 2) how perpetrator religion impacts these
coverage disparities.
We examined media coverage of terrorist attacks in the United States to
understand why some receive more coverage than others. Our paper is organized as
follows: First, we engage with the literature on media coverage of violence, crime, and
terrorism, and discuss factors that impact why some events receive more coverage than
others. Following this, we discuss our methodological approach to examining media

coverage of terrorism, our sample, and our analyses. Lastly, we conclude with the
results of this study, how they pertain to policy and public perception, and avenues for
future research.

Media Coverage
Why Media Coverage Matters
Most of the information we get about the world outside of our local context comes from
the media. As such, media play a vital role in how we form ideas about people, places,
and things which we have not personally experienced (McCombs, 2003). Media
attention lends legitimacy to the voices and frames—the conceptions and organizations
of information that help us understand the world around us—that are chosen to be
featured (Bekkers, Beunders, Edwards, & Moody, 2011). Media coverage also amplifies
incidents and ideas by providing a platform to spread certain positions and perspectives
to a broader audience (Bekkers, et al., 2011). This platform is further expanded by
members of the public disseminating media amongst themselves (Nacos, 2002). In a
recent study, King, Schneer and White (2017) found that media coverage of subjects of
the researchers’ choosing significantly increased online discussion of that topic
immediately and this effect persisted for nearly a week. People also discuss news
media content in various forums, resulting in further—not necessarily accurate—
analysis of the information provided.
The rapid spread of information—regardless of its veracity—is especially
common when focusing events occur. A focusing event is a sudden, attention-grabbing
event that draws public awareness to an issue (Kingdon, 1995). In addition to being
attention-grabbing and easy to politicize, focusing events are also relatively uncommon,
reveal a cause of harm or potential harm, and are depicted as being particular to certain
areas or groups (Kingdon, 1995). When something becomes a focusing event, debates
and discussions surrounding certain policy topics markedly increase and receive greater
media attention (Kingdon, 1995). Media coverage does not necessarily determine how
we feel about these issues, but it sets the tone for which issues we discuss and how we
discuss them (McCombs, 2003).
Particularly when discussing an issue that people do not directly experience,
media creates a perspective for viewers that may be incongruent with reality (Gerbner,
1998). Media are primarily responsible for providing information, and thus frames, to the
public in the aftermath of a terrorist attack (Altheide, 1987). There is clear evidence that
media coverage impacts public perception across a host of topics including civic
engagement (McCarthy, McPhail & Smith, 1996), mental health issues (Stack, 2003),
and national security threats (Slone, 2000). Further, both news media (Graziano,
Schuck & Martin, 2010; Miller & Davis, 2008; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005) and entertainment
media (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011; Donahue & Miller, 2006; Donovan & Klahm,
2015; Eschholz, Blackwell, Gertz & Chiricos, 2002; Kearns & Young, 2017) impact the
public’s views of crime and justice. When people do not have direct experience with a

topic—as is almost always the case for terrorism—media depictions are especially
impactful (Adoni & Mane, 1984). Moreover, media is primarily responsible for providing
information to the public, who use that information to contextualize and understand
terrorism.
When news media spends time on an issue, this suggests to the public that the
topic is valid and important for understanding the world around them. The amount of
attention that a story gets is an indicator of its importance (McCombs, 2003). The “CNN
effect”—whereby media influences politics and government during conflict and natural
disasters—suggests that media framing can impact public opinion and potentially sway
policy decisions (Gilboa, 2005). Exposure to media coverage of terrorist attacks is
positively correlated to perceived personal risk for being victimized, fear of others (Nellis
& Savage, 2012), and short-term anxiety levels (Slone, 2000). Media are especially
impactful at setting public discourse and, as a result, influencing public opinion in regard
to limiting or protecting personal freedoms and civil liberties, as they feature and
prioritize certain political viewpoints and narratives over others (Guasti & Mansfeldova,
2013; Hall, 2012; Norris et al., 2003). Political organizations use media to set the
priorities of the public (Chermak 2003), which means that biases in media reporting can
have real world consequences. In short, media coverage influences public opinion and
perceptions of the world, which can, in turn, influence how the public perceives relevant
people, policies, and groups.
Media Coverage of Violence
In the United States, violent crime has been declining steadily for the past twenty
years,7 yet public perceptions of violent crime do not reflect this.8 In fact, as the violent
crime rate in the United States decreases, people still perceive that it is increasing
(Gramlich, 2017). Media may influence this disparity in perceptions of violence. For
example, homicides receive a disproportionate amount of news coverage relative to
both the actual risk of being victimized and the frequency of the crime (Sorenson, Manz
& Berk, 1998; Paulsen, 2003; Peelo, Francis, Soothill, Pearson & Ackery, 2004).
Violence, broadly construed, is one of the most prominent topics in the news media, and
enjoys something of a privileged position, yet it is rare in day to day life for much of the
audience. Slone (2000) argues that media influence increases as actual experience with
a problem decreases, which could explain this discrepancy between real and perceived
violent crime rates. Taking this into account, perhaps it is unsurprising that half of
Americans are concerned that they or a family member will be the victim of a terrorist
attack, despite the actual risk being miniscule (Jones & Cox, 2015).
Of course, media covering a topic does not necessarily indicate its subjective (or,
indeed, objective) relevance for a given individual or the public at large. An event may
be attentiongrabbing, but lose relevance quickly. For a topic to maintain relevance it
must receive ongoing coverage by the media for approximately one to eight weeks
(Coleman, McCombs, Shaw & Weaver, 2009). The perceived relevance of an incident
fades as time passes without the media referring to it (Coleman, et al., 2009). Given the

current “infotainment” format of news media, stories are selected for coverage based on
how much attention they can potentially attract (Xiang & Sarvary, 2007). Coverage of
violence fills that role, while also potentially providing useful information to the viewer.
Media Coverage of Terrorism
While some terrorist attacks are sensationalized and extensively covered, the majority
receive little to no media attention (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). An issue’s
relevance influences the amount of media coverage that it receives (McCarthy et al.,
1996). Some terrorist attacks may be deemed more relevant than others due to their
inherently political, attention-grabbing nature and potential to be a focusing event.
Terrorism lends itself to being used as a focusing event, as it is uncommon and can
raise awareness of potential weak points in national security. To give a few recent
examples, media coverage of Dylann Roof’s terrorist attack against the congregation of
the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church sparked fierce debates about the
Confederate Flag and gun control policy in the United States. Robert Lewis Dear’s
attack on a Planned Parenthood facility was used to argue that promoting misleading
information could have deadly consequences. In short, these attacks are used as
focusing events, shifting the public discourse to political topics secondary to terrorism
itself and often facilitating or inspiring new policy.
Brian Jenkins (1974, p.4) stated that “terrorism is theater,” a metaphor reflecting
that perpetrators engage in violence to communicate with an audience. Media coverage
of attacks amplifies a group’s messaging and sensationalizes the event (Picard, 1993).
In this respect, media and terrorist groups have a mutually reinforcing relationship. Yet,
media do not cover all terrorism equally. Focusing on terrorism in the United States
between 1980 and September 10th, 2001, Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) found that
attacks received more coverage if there were casualties, if it was a hijacking, if an airline
was targeted, or if domestic groups were involved. In this study, perpetrator identity was
not considered as a factor that would impact the amount of coverage an attack receives.
Even minor attacks may receive coverage if the target, location, or groups involved are
of high symbolic or political significance to the public (Nacos, 2002). Further, evidence
suggests that a terrorist attack will receive less coverage if it is framed as a crime
(Persson, 2004). Whether an attack is framed as terrorism or a crime is complicated by
the fact that there is no one accepted definition of terrorism to rely on, even among
experts (Schmid, 2015; Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). Indeed, there are myriad potential
factors that can impact why a particular terrorist attack receives more news coverage
than others. We are interested in how the following factors influence the amount of
news coverage that a given terrorist attack will receive: who committed the attack, what
the target was, and how many people were killed.
Who is the perpetrator?
Events are more newsworthy if they can be typified as reflecting current beliefs
and social structure, and can be scripted in ways that reinforce stereotypes (Lundman,

2003). Consistent with the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), media in
the predominantly white, Christian United States may portray members of this in-group
in a more favorable way than people who are not members of the majority race or
religion. In the context of entertainment media, such as 24 or Homeland, we generally
see Muslim or Arab actors portraying terrorists while white actors play the hero
(Alsultany, 2012). In fact, Shaheen (2012) found clear evidence that most Arab movie
characters are portrayed as dangerous stereotypes—as sub-human or villains—while
Arab protagonists often have surprisingly Caucasian features. Similarly, in news media,
perpetrators of terrorism are disproportionately non-white (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000).
While perhaps not intentional, it seems unlikely that disparities in entertainment
media coverage based on race and religion are coincidental. Media coverage may
explain public perceptions of terrorism and identity. Evidence suggests that, to
Americans, there is an implicit association between terrorism, people of Middle Eastern
descent, and Islam (Alsultany, 2012; Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Park, Felix, & Lee,
2007; Saleem & Anderson, 2013). In the United Kingdom, Muslims—particularly those
who are foreign-born—are increasingly viewed as a national security threat (Allouche &
Lind, 2010). Huff and Kertzer (2017) found that members of the public are more likely to
consider an attack terrorism when the perpetrator is Muslim. Similarly, when presented
with news stories about real crimes, incidents committed by Muslims were more likely to
be labeled as terrorism and were also judged more harshly (West & Lloyd, 2017).
Turning to media coverage of terrorism and identity, similar patterns emerge.
Dixon and Williams (2015) found that Muslims were vastly overrepresented in broadcast
media coverage of terrorism. Similarly, in two prominent Australian newspapers, news
stories about Middle Eastern people often focused on terrorism, asylum seekers, and
cultural practices that are alien to Western cultures (Akbarzadeh & Smith, 2005). Even
in cases where the depictions of Muslims were sympathetic or neutral, media still
positioned stories almost exclusively in ways that emphasized their otherness and dealt
with the topic of terrorism (Akbarzadeh & Smith, 2005).
Media may frame terrorism as a specifically Muslim problem because that is a
dominant narrative (Sultan, 2016). Domestic terrorism is often portrayed as a minor
threat committed by mentally ill perpetrators, whereas terrorism influenced by radical
interpretation of Islam is framed as a hostile outside force (Powell, 2011). If the
perpetrators were Muslim and the victims Christian, the innocence and goodness of the
victims and their spirituality will often be presented in juxtaposition with Islam (Powell,
2011). When the perpetrator(s) of a terrorist attack are members of an out-group or
“other,” we should expect to see more media coverage. Since discussions of terrorism
and counterterrorism often overly focus on Muslim perpetrators,9 we expect the
following:
H1: Terrorist attacks will receive more media coverage when the perpetrator is
Muslim than when the perpetrator is not Muslim

While we expect that the perpetrator’s identity will be the strongest predictor of
the amount of media coverage an attack receives, we anticipate other factors will have
significant influence as well. Perpetrators of terrorist attacks may be apprehended,
killed, or escape capture or identification. Perpetrators who are arrested provide more
opportunities for media coverage as they are charged, stand trial, and, if found guilty,
sentenced. Accordingly, we expect the following:
H2: Terrorist attacks will receive more media coverage when the perpetrator is
arrested than the perpetrator is not arrested
What is the target?
The relative sociological relationship between a victim and offender influence the
way in which law is applied for punishment (Black, 1976). Stemming from this dyadic
perspective, the target type may influence media coverage of violence. In a study of
international terrorism, attacks against politically significant targets received more
coverage (Zhang, Shoemaker & Wang, 2013). Members of the public are also more
inclined to label an attack as “terrorism” when the target is governmental (Authors,
2017). In so far as terrorism is a tactic to influence politics, attacks on governmental
facilities or employees may generate increased media coverage. From this, we
expected that:
H3: Terrorist attacks will receive more media coverage when the target is a
governmental facility or employee(s) than when the target is non-governmental
How many people were harmed?
The adage “if it bleeds it leads” suggests that news coverage focuses on violent
or gory stories (Miller & Albert, 2015). When more people are killed in an attack, this can
increase the shock value to viewers and increase fear of terrorism (Zhang et al., 2013).
Therefore, when there is more death and destruction, we should see more coverage
(Nacos, 2002). As Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) found in a study of media coverage
on domestic terrorism pre-9/11, at least one casualty led to both an increase in the
number of articles written about that attack and the length of those article. Media may
cover higher fatality count attacks more because death is both newsworthy and draws
readers in. We expect that:
H4: Terrorist attacks will receive increased media coverage as the number of
fatalities caused by the attack increases.
Alternative explanations
There are many potential idiosyncratic factors that impact media coverage of an
event. We identify five testable counterarguments. First, white homicide victims receive
more media coverage than minority victims (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Pizarro, 2013).
Drawing from the disparities in homicide coverage, the discussion on out-groups, and
the societal position of the victim(s), it is also possible that attacks against an out-group

receive less media coverage. Second, symbolism can be important in terrorism. Certain
dates, such as Hitler’s birthday and the anniversary of 9/11, attract more violence.10
When attacks occur within close proximity to these symbolic dates, they may receive
more media coverage. Third, we may expect to see less media coverage when
responsibility for the attack is unknown (Weimann & Brosius 1991; Weimann & Winn
1994). Fourth, we may expect to see more coverage when the individual(s) responsible
are connected with a larger group that uses terrorism. Lastly, when classifying whether
or not a violent incident is terrorism there can be insufficient or contradicting information
that makes it difficult to make a definitive determination. If experts question whether or
not an incident should be considered terrorism, members of the media may have similar
difficulties. It is possible that classification differences can explain variation in coverage,
potentially resulting in ambiguous cases receiving less media attention. We tested our
argument on why some attacks received more media coverage than others against
these alternatives. Additionally, some factors, such as a major event occurring at the
same time to crowd out the news cycle, are difficult to operationalize and model.
Whether or not a manhunt occurred plausibly could impact coverage of a terrorist
attack. Unfortunately, it is infeasible to operationalize a manhunt in a consistent way
across attacks.11

Methods
Data
The data for this study consisted of media coverage for terrorist attacks in the United
States between 2006 and 2015,12 as listed in the GTD.13 While the GTD lists 170
terrorist attacks during this ten-year span, several of the attacks were perpetrated by the
same individual(s), and thus are reported together in media. We collapsed multiple
attacks with the same perpetrator(s) into a single terrorism episode to avoid counting
the same articles numerous times. In total, there were 136 terrorism episodes in the
United States during this time.
To measure media coverage, we focused on two sources: LexisNexis Academic
and CNN.com14 LexisNexis Academic searches through the full text of thousands of
news publications. For the purpose of this study, we limited the search results to
newspaper coverage15 from USbased sources between the date of the attack and the
end of 2016.16 LexisNexis searches news articles from national sources such as The
New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and USA Today, as well
as local newspapers from around the country. To supplement these results, we
searched CNN.com’s archives to obtain additional news coverage that is solely in digital
format. For each incident, we searched for the perpetrator(s) (if known), the location,
and other key words about the attack. In this initial stage, our goal was over-inclusion of
potential articles. From this, we culled the final list to only include articles where the
attack, perpetrator(s), or victim(s) were the primary focus. We removed the following
types of articles most frequently: lists of every attack of a given type; political or policyfocused articles where the attack or perpetrators were an anecdote to a larger debate,

such as abortion or gun control;17 and discussion of vigils held in other locations. In
total, we included 3,541 news articles in our dataset. A full list of terrorism episodes and
the amount of coverage each received can be found in the appendix. The dataset
generated and analyzed for the current study is available from the corresponding author
on reasonable request.
Variables
Dependent variable
The outcome variable for all hypotheses was the number of news stories about
the incident. We added the number of relevant articles from LexisNexis Academic and
CNN.com to yield the total number of articles for each terrorism series. National media
outlets may cover terrorism differently than outlets primarily focused on a local
audience. To examine differences in coverage by audience, we also estimate models
with the total number of articles from major sources18 only (35.6% of the articles) and
with the total number of articles from other sources only (64.4% of the articles). The key
independent variables fall into three categories: perpetrator-level factors, target type,
and casualties.19 Information to code these variables came from news reports and the
GTD.
Independent variables
Three binary perpetrator-level variables were coded: perpetrator Muslim,
perpetrator arrested, and unknown perpetrator. When there were multiple perpetrators,
we coded the variable as 1 if any of the perpetrators fell into a category. When the
perpetrator was unknown, we coded both perpetrator Muslim and perpetrator arrested
as a 0.20 In the present dataset, the individual person(s) responsible for the attacks is
unknown 40.4% of the time.21
Three binary target type variables were coded: law enforcement/governmental
target, Muslim target,22 and minority target. We measured fatalities as the number of
people killed— excluding the perpetrator(s)—in each terrorism series.23 Lastly, we
included a binary indicator to denote whether or not the attack occurred near a
symbolically significant event in the United States as a control for another factor that
could increase the amount of coverage that an attack receives. If an attack occurred
within a week of Hitler’s birthday (April 20th), 4th of July, September 11th, or Christmas
(December 25th), this was coded as 1. When there were multiple incidents in a
terrorism series, this was coded as 1 if any of the events take place within a week of a
significant date.
On average, each of the 136 terrorism incidents was covered in 26 news articles.
However, the distribution is highly skewed. Over one quarter of the incidents received
no coverage from the sources that we searched while other attacks received
disproportionate coverage. In the present dataset, Muslims perpetrated 12.5% of the
attacks yet received 50.4% of the news coverage. The perpetrator was arrested in

about half (47.1%) of the incidents. Attacks targeted law enforcement or government
20.6% of the time. On average, less than one person was killed per attack, though this
again is highly skewed with the vast majority of attacks (81.6%) having no fatalities. See
Table 1 for descriptive information about each variable.

Results
Negative binomial regression models24 are most appropriate25 since the
dependent variable is a non-negative count of news articles per attack. In Table 2, we
display the results of six models. As expected in hypothesis 1, Model 1 shows that
attacks by Muslims receive significantly more coverage than attacks by non-Muslims. Of
course, factors other than the perpetrator’s religion impact the amount of coverage the
attack receives. As Model 2 shows, all of our hypotheses are supported. If the
perpetrator is Muslim, we see 357% more news stories about the attack. Model 2 also

shows a 287% increase in coverage when the perpetrator is arrested, a 211% increase
if the target is governmental, and a 46% increase per fatality, on average. Models 3
through 6 include variables to test counterarguments about the target type, significant
dates, and the perpetrator being unknown, but the fundamental results remain
unchanged.
Table 2. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode (N=136)

We suggested five possible alternative explanations for the amount of news
coverage that a terrorist attack receives. First, it is possible that some targets receive
less media coverage than others. When the target is an out-group member—such as a
Muslim target or a minority target in general—the attack may receive less coverage. As
we see, however, neither targeting Muslims (Models 3 and 5) nor minorities (Models 4

and 6) impact coverage. Second, when an attack occurs in close temporal proximity to a
significant date, the attack may receive more coverage. Yet, Models 3 through 6 show
that symbolic timing does not impact the amount of coverage that an attack receives.
Third, when the perpetrating individual(s) or group is unknown, this may impact
coverage. In Models 3 and 4, we see that attacks where both the individual(s) and
group responsible are unknown received about 70% less coverage. In these models,
the other variables remain significant but the impact is reduced for all factors except the
number of fatalities. Fourth, all models reported were estimated to account for attacks
connected with a larger group. As shown in the appendix (Models A21-A40), incidents
connected to a group do not receive more coverage and accounting for this factor does
not impact the effect of other variables on coverage.
Table 3. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met (N=113)

Differences in coverage may be explained by whether or not there is doubt about
classifying the attack as terrorism. To test this, we estimated the models reported in
Table 2 with only cases where there is “essentially no doubt as to whether the incident
is an act of terrorism” (GTD Codebook, p. 14)26. As shown on Table 3, our results
largely hold. One exception is that targeting the government is no longer significant,
though this is unsurprising since the vast majority of those attacks are clearly terrorism.
For the variables that remain significant, the magnitude of each’s impact on the
outcome is similar and the effect of a Muslim perpetrator is stronger.
Table 4. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood (N=134)

Across this ten-year period, two terrorist attacks dominated news coverage. The
Boston Marathon and Fort Hood attacks together account for over a quarter of media
coverage on terrorism (13.4% and 11.9%, respectively). Hyper-salient events like this
drive media coverage and may also be driving our results.27 To test this, we estimated
all models with these two cases excluded. As shown on Table 4, our hypotheses are
still supported. The magnitude of our main predictor— the perpetrator being Muslim—
was slightly stronger with 369% more coverage when these two attacks are removed
from the analyses (Model 14). The impact of the other key variables remains roughly the
same. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that when we remove the Boston Marathon bombing
and the Fort Hood shooting and only include cases where there is no doubt that it is
terrorism, the results remain unchanged. Again, the magnitude increased to an
expected 405% more coverage when the perpetrator is Muslim (Model 20). In this
model, the impact of a perpetrator being arrested is slightly lower and the impact of
each additional fatality is slightly higher.
Table 5. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met without
Boston Bombing or Fort Hood (N=111)

We estimated the models previously discussed by disaggregated the outcome variable
to compare results between major and non-major sources. Figure 1 compares the
results of our main model across: 1) the whole sample, 2) only non-major sources, and
3) only major sources. Across source type, whether or not the perpetrator was arrested,
whether or not the attack targeted government or law enforcement, and the number of
fatalities have approximately the same impact on coverage (Models A41-A60).
Importantly, there is no meaningful difference in the impact of these three independent
variables by source type. However, we see clear differences in the extent to which a
Muslim perpetrator generates additional media coverage. Across the whole sample,
attacks receive 357% more coverage on average when the perpetrator is Muslim.
Among non-major sources, the expected increase in coverage is 228% whereas the
increase in coverage among major sources is 758%. Across the 24 main models
reported in text, incidents perpetrated by a Muslim receive between 1.81 and 4.93 times
more coverage from major sources relative to non-major sources.
Figure 1. Percent Increase in Coverage by Attack Attributes and Source Type (N=136)

In sum, we find strong evidence to support all of our hypotheses. Attacks receive
significantly more coverage when: the perpetrator is Muslim, the perpetrator is arrested,
the target is law enforcement or government, and there are more fatalities. While most
factors have a similar impact on the extent of additional media coverage between major

and non-major sources, attacks by Muslims received drastically more coverage in
national media sources than in sources focused on more local audiences.

Discussion
The motivating questions for this project were whether there are quantitative
differences in the amounts of coverage, and why some terrorist attacks receive more
media coverage than others. Research on media and terrorism has largely focused on
framing within articles and the impact this has on public opinion (Norris et al., 2003;
Powell, 2011; Ruigrok & Attevelt, 2007). Since some attacks are not covered at all while
others receive the bulk of media coverage, the quantity of articles is also important for
public perception of terrorism. In a study using pre-9/11 data, attack-level factors
impacted coverage but the perpetrator’s identity was not included among them
(Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). To our knowledge, this is the first post-9/11 and digital
media age study focused on the quantity of coverage that terrorist attacks receives.
Additionally, this is the first study to explicitly examine how perpetrator religion impacts
coverage across such a wide range of terrorism cases.
Myriad factors may impact why a particular terrorist attack receives more
coverage than another. By modeling coverage over all terrorist attacks in the United
States during a ten-year period, we are able to identify trends in coverage. As we see
here, perpetrator religion matters for the quantity of coverage that an attack receives.
We found clear evidence that terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims receive drastically
more media coverage than attacks by non-Muslims. This finding is consistent with the
literature on social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) that highlights in-group and out-group
dynamics whereby people who are perceived as “others” are portrayed and perceived
more negatively. Research has shown similar media bias against Muslims and Arabs in
the context of entertainment media (Shaheen, 2012). Our findings clearly show that
similar biases against Muslims exist in media coverage of terrorism. In part, this may
explain why people implicitly connect terrorism and Islam (Park et al., 2007; Saleem &
Anderson, 2013) and view Muslims as a threat to national security (Allouche & Lind,
2010). Coverage disparities may also explain why people are more likely to consider an
incident to be “terrorism” when the perpetrator is Muslim (Huff & Kertzer, 2017), which
can create a feedback loop that perpetuates biases in both media coverage and public
perception.
Each of our other hypotheses were supported. Specifically, when a perpetrator
of an attack is arrested we find significantly more coverage. This may be driven in part
by the fact that an arrest is a newsworthy event in its own right, and especially so when
linked to a terrorist attack. If indeed “terrorism is theatre” as Jenkins (1974) posits, then
an arrest made in a terrorism case provides another opportunity to spark audience
interest, thereby extending the show.
We also find that attacks against the government receive more coverage.
Terrorism inherently has a political dimension. As such, attacks that target the
government send a clearer signal about intent, which may result in media coverage.
However, this result is inconsistent with Chermak and Gruenewald’s (2006) finding that

pre-9/11 attacks against government targets received less coverage when contrasted
with airline hijackings. Consistent with Chermak and Gruenewald’s (2006) analyses, the
number of fatalities in a given attack has a significant impact on the extent of coverage.
Because fatal events tend to be covered more in general, we anticipated that higher
numbers of casualties would generate additional focus in instances of terrorism as well.
Across most of the models, the variables testing other counterarguments were
not significant. Attacks that targeted either Muslims specifically or minorities in general
did not receive less media coverage. Although Moeller (2009, p. 70) notes “coverage of
victims, the dead and the survivors, is not egalitarian,” the current findings do not
suggest a clear distinction in coverage based on whether an attack primarily targeted
members of a minority group. While minority homicide victims receive less media
coverage (Gruenewald et al., 2013), our results may suggest that terrorism coverage is
more strongly driven by other factors. It is also possible that target identity impacts
coverage in certain media outlets but not others, though this is beyond the scope of the
present study. Further, we found that incidents that occurred near significant dates did
not receive more coverage. While it stands to reason that the symbolic value of
particular dates might add context or additional interest to coverage of an attack thereby
generating more coverage, this was not supported. Surprisingly and contradicting
previous scholarship (Weimann & Brosius, 1991; Weimann & Winn, 1994), there was no
difference in the amount of coverage for attacks connected to a larger group versus
those without this connection. While attacks connected to larger groups automatically
have name recognition, our results show that this does not drive coverage. In some
models, attacks received less coverage when neither the perpetrator nor group
responsible were known, though the other key variables were still significant.
In sum, our results and the robustness of our models demonstrate the strength of
the conclusion that media give disproportionate coverage to terrorism when the
perpetrator is Muslim, though other factors also matter. We find that the identity of a
perpetrator as Muslim has primacy as the key driver of the amount of coverage, relative
to each of the other factors. Thus, the findings reported here empirically establish
perpetrator religion as the most substantial element of what drives overall coverage.
We demonstrate that our findings are robust against a number of alternative
explanations. In all of the models we estimated, attacks where the perpetrator was
Muslim received significantly more media coverage. This result was strengthened when
we only included incidents that clearly met all criteria on the definition of terrorism.
Similarly, our results were strengthened when we excluded the Boston Marathon
bombing and the Fort Hood shooting. This demonstrates that the two most high-profile
events in the dataset were not driving our results. Somewhat surprisingly, Muslim
perpetrated attacks receive the most coverage—by far—from major, national news
sources. The five major sources in our study provided over a third (35.6%) of the
articles we analyzed. Taken together, this suggests that sources with the broadest
readership make up a sizeable proportion of terrorism coverage in the United States
and this coverage tends to focus on attacks by Muslims. It is not clear—and beyond the
scope of the project to determine—what impact this has on public perceptions of

terrorism. Yet, it is reasonable to think that coverage disparities may help explain why
people are more likely to define violence as “terrorism” when the perpetrator is Muslim
(Authors, 2017; Huff & Kertzer, 2018). To date, research on terrorism media coverage
has not examined differences in the amount of coverage that attacks receive based on
the source. As the present study suggests, however, these differences do exist between
national and local outlets.
When people think about terrorism, events like the Boston Marathon bombing
and the Fort Hood shooting are what come to mind. This is not surprising considering
that these two incidents received over a quarter of the coverage in the U.S. over the last
decade. Yet, so much is missed. Based on fatalities, there are a few attacks in the
dataset that received less coverage than we would expect. Wade Michael Page’s attack
on the Sikh Temple in Wisconsin killed 6 people and it only received 2.6% of the total
coverage. Frazier Glenn Miller’s attack on a synagogue in Kansas killed 3 people and it
only received 2.2% of the coverage. Dylann Roof killed 9 people in an AfricanAmerican
church in Charleston and received 5.1% of the coverage. These attacks have two things
in common: the perpetrator was a white man and the targets were both religious and
minority groups. These instances highlight disparity in media coverage of terrorism.

Conclusions
Limitations and Future Directions
From the present study, we see that characteristics of a terrorist attack and its
perpetrator(s) impact the amount of coverage that it receives from media. When
something is covered more extensively, it is in the public’s eye more often. This can
connote significance and can skew public perceptions. While our findings are clear and
robust, they are not without limitation. First, our study is limited to print and online
media. Since broadcast media has space constraints with air time, it is reasonable to
expect that coverage disparities would be further exacerbated in television and radio
coverage. To explore this, future research could replicate our project with broadcast
coverage. Second, our dataset is limited to the United States so the extent to which our
findings are generalizable more broadly is unclear. In the future, we plan to conduct
similar analyses in other countries to address concerns with generalizability. Third, we
are focused on terrorism and media coverage since 2006. As we have discussed, there
are methodological reasons to limit our study of print and online media coverage to this
timeframe. Exploring these differences using print media only or using select broadcast
media over a longer time-span is another avenue for future research. Finally, some
media outlets may selectively cover certain attacks more than others in a way the
reflects the ideological perspective of the news organization. If this occurs, we would
see uneven coverage of attacks both within and across news sources. In such cases,
the source of coverage and select factors of interest (i.e., targeting a minority group)
may interact in ways that provide a finer-grained perspective on how particular news
organizations cover and label such attacks, rather than the aggregate level of coverage

across many news organizations. While this level of analysis is beyond the scope of the
current research, it presents an interesting avenue for future research.
Beyond just the quantity of coverage, it is also important to analyze the content of
what is said. Research on media frames and terrorism reporting tends to focus on a few
key events, such as the London and Madrid bombings (Ruigrok & Attevelt, 2007).
Insights derived from such work help us to understand media coverage, but limit our
ability to compare how numerous different attacks are framed. Powell (2011) focused on
media coverage of 11 terrorist attacks in the US from 9/11 through 2009 and found
qualitative differences in how attacks are framed based on the perpetrator’s identity.
One of her selection criteria for inclusion, however, is that the attack was reported on as
“terrorism” in media. However, media might be reticent to use the term “terrorist” to
describe some attackers relative to others, particularly to the extent that the term carries
the connotation of making a value judgment (Maguire, 2007).
Policy Implications
When President Trump asserted that the media does not cover some terrorist
attacks enough,28 he was correct. However, his assertion that attacks by Muslim
perpetrators received less coverage is unsubstantiated. All attacks in this study are
considered terrorism by experts and should be covered as such. Yet, media do not
cover these events equally. Even when controlling for other factors that may impact
coverage, attacks perpetrated by Muslim receive a disproportionate amount of media
coverage. In the present data, Muslims perpetrated 12.5% of the attacks yet received
half of the news coverage.
The way in which media frames an issue can impact public perception (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981). Whether the disproportionate coverage is a conscious decision on
the part of journalists or not, this stereotyping reinforces cultural narratives about what
and who should be feared. By covering terrorist attacks by Muslims dramatically more
than other incidents, media frame this type of event as more prevalent. These findings
help explain why half of Americans fear that they or someone they know will be a victim
of terrorism29 and implicitly link terrorism and Islam (Saleem & Anderson, 2013). Reality
demonstrates, however, that these fears are misplaced.
One way to combat misplaced fears about terrorism is to change the public
narrative on terrorism to cover attacks more evenly and based on consistently applied
criteria. A robust body of research shows that media coverage impacts perceptions
across a range of issues (Callanan & Rosenberger, 2011; McCarthy et al., 1996; Stack,
2003), including terrorism and security threats (Norris et al., 2003; Slone, 2000). While
we see media’s impact broadly, this connection is particularly strong for topics with
which people lack direct experience (Gerbner, 1998). We see that people think crime
rates are going up when the opposite is true, and that media coverage likely drives this
incorrect perception. From this, it is reasonable to expect that media coverage of
terrorism has a similar impact on the public. When attacks perpetrated by Muslims
receive drastically more coverage, audiences may think these attacks are more
common and become more afraid of Muslim terrorists. This misperception can create a

feedback loop of incorrect information fueling prejudice and discrimination. Moreover,
such misperceptions may prevent the acknowledgment and addressing of other
pressing security threats that have a factually rooted basis.
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6
In the current study, the definitional criteria for what constitutes terrorism have been
established in the development of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. According to the
GTD Codebook, terrorism is “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence
by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear,
coercion, or intimidation.” Additional details about the definition of terrorism used in the
GTD are available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/ . See Schmid (2015) for a
more detailed discussion of the challenges related to defining terrorism, along with
consideration of over 250 definitions that have been applied over time
7
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/violent-crime/violentcrime-topicpage/violentcrimemain_final
8
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/16/voters-perceptions-of-crimecontinue-to-conflict-with-reality/
9
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ECDB_IslamistFarRightHomicidesUS_Infogra
phic_Feb2017.pdf
10
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-strange-seasonality-of-violence-why-aprilis-the-beginning-of-thekilling-season/2016/04/03/4e05d092-f6c0-11e5-9804537defcc3cf6_story.html?utm_term=.ca9fc4cd77e8
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If this were binary, it would assume an hours-long foot search and a month-long hunt
through the wilderness are the equivalent. If we count duration, then that implies the few
days-long search for the Tsarnaev brothers that shut down Boston is less meaningful
than the 48-day search for Eric Frein through the Pennsylvania wilderness. Given the
diversity of what a manhunt can entail, we do not think it is advisable to control for this
in a regression model.
12
Starting in 2006, an increasing percentage of Americans used the Internet as their
main source of news. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/16/12-trendsshaping-digital-news/ Since the news sources used for this study include both print and
online newspaper articles, we started our analysis in 2006. In years prior to 2006, we
may see fewer articles overall since print was more common and is subject to space
constraints.
13
The Global Terrorism Database is a systematic and unbiased source that codes
terrorism at the incident-level around the world from 1970 to 2016. The GTD is the most
comprehensive and complete dataset available on terrorism. At the time of data
collection, 2015 was the most recent year of data released by the GTD.
14
While we wanted to include searches from sources across the political spectrum,
such as Fox News and Huffington Post, neither has a searchable archive going back to
2006 and email requests for archive access were not answered.
15
It is beyond our current scope to conduct a systematic study of television and radio
coverage from both national and local stations across a decade span. Furthermore,
broadcast media have a fixed amount of airtime so coverage disparities should be
exacerbated. Including TV and radio coverage in our study would likely bias the results
in favor of larger or more sensational events that dominate news coverage.
16
By the end of 2016, all known perpetrators had either pled guilty or gone to trial with
the exception of Robert Lewis Dear. Dear is currently not competent to stand trial, so we
expect occasional coverage of this going forward. Otherwise, we do not expect any
ongoing coverage of the incidents, perpetrators, or victims listed in this dataset.
17
For example: Dylann Roof’s attack sparked debate about the Confederate Flag and
gun control; Robert Lewis Dear’s attack led to discussion about gun control and abortion
rights; the Boston Bombing increased discussions about immigration; and, the San
Bernadino attack generated a discussion about immigration, gun control, and Apple
refusing to unlock the perpetrator’s iPhone.
18
There are five major, national media outlets in our dataset: CNN.com, The New York
Times, Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and USA Today.
19
All variables were double coded, inconsistencies in coding were discussed, and final
codes were agreed upon for all variables in each incident. In a few instances where
coding could be disputed, we estimated models both ways and the results were
unchanged.
20
In terrorism, the perpetrator is often unknown so treating these as missing data and
dropping the incidents is not appropriate. We recognize that for incidents where the
perpetrator is unknown, it is possible that some were committed by Muslims but there is
no way to know this. Essentially, there are three categories of perpetrator: Perpetrator
11

Known & Muslim; Perpetrator Known & Not Muslim; and Perpetrator Unknown. Even
when the individual perpetrator is unknown, we often know the group responsible so
“perpetrator unknown” is not a theoretically sound category on its own, though we
account for these incidents in robustness checks. In the models reported, we collapsed
Perpetrator Unknown and Perpetrator Known & Not Muslim into a single category (0)
and compared to Perpetrator Known & Muslim (1). To ensure that our results are not an
artifact of whether or not the perpetrator is known, we also estimated all models where
Perpetrator Unknown or Perpetrator Known & Muslim are collapsed into a single
category (0) and compared to Perpetrator Known & Not Muslims (1) Across all models
reported in the main text and the appendix, attacks where the perpetrator is known and
not Muslim do not receive a significantly different amount of news coverage. In contrast,
incidents where the perpetrator is known and Muslim receive significantly more
coverage in all models. These findings give us additional confidence in our conclusions.
21
This is common for terrorism: approximately 13% of incidents globally are claimed
(Kearns, Conlon & Young 2014) and 40% are attributed to a particular group (GTD,
2016). Even when the individual perpetrator is unknown, we often know the group or
movement responsible. For example, attacks claimed by the Animal Liberation Front still
send a clear message even in the absence of an arrest or identification of the
individual(s) responsible. Thus, simply considering attacks where the perpetrator is
unknown is not appropriate in terrorism studies. Instead, we control for unknown
responsibility in two ways. First, we created a dummy variable for incidents where
neither the perpetrator nor group are known. Second, we created a dummy variable for
incidents where the perpetrator, group, and motive are all unknown.
22
We include the 2012 Sikh temple shooting in Oak Creek, Wisconsin and the 2015
attack on the Sikh bus driver in Los Angeles in this calculation. Evidence suggests that
these attacks were Islamophobia-inspired and the perpetrators were unaware of the
difference between Sikhs and Muslims.
23
The number of people wounded may also impact the amount of coverage that an
attack receives. The vast majority (96.3%) of attacks wounded fewer than 10 people.
Five attacks had more than 10 wounded: the Austin IRS attack, San Bernadino, Fort
Hood, the West Texas Explosion, and the Boston Bombing. While casualties likely
impact coverage, injuries are not of the same magnitude as fatalities. If we were to
include the counts of both, this would assume that fatalities and casualties have the
same impact on media coverage and that the relationship is linear. Rather, to account
for the non-linear relationship between casualties and coverage, we logged the number
wounded. The correlation between the number of fatalities and the log of number
wounded is 0.63 so including both variables in a model introduces concerns of
multicollinearity. We created an additive variable (number killed plus log of number
wounded) to bluntly account for the impact of casualties on coverage, though this
measure is difficult to substantively interpret. As shown in the appendix (Models A1A20), results are substantively and significantly similar across all models.
24
All models are estimated with bootstrapped standard errors to minimize the impact of
outliers with the small number of observations. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and

Baysian Information Criterion (BIC) are presented to compare model fit where lower
values suggest greater congruence with the true model. The extent to which one model
is preferred to another depends on the magnitude of difference between model fit
statistics (Raftery, 1995). Models discussed in text have either a weak or positive
difference between alternatives.
25
A high proportion (N=36, 26.5%) of the attacks in these data did not receive any news
coverage. Thus zero-inflated negative binomial regression models were also estimated.
Vuong tests of the zero-inflated negative binomial versus a standard negative binomial
indicate that the negative binomial models are preferred.
26
Descriptive statistics for each variable are relatively unchanged, as shown in the
appendix.
27
The next most covered attack, Faisal Shahzad’s attempted bomb in Times Square,
received less than half the coverage of these. By the statistical definition, 17% of the
cases are outliers due to the skewed distribution of coverage. Yet, there is not a sound
argument for dropping all of these observations from the dataset since this is the reality
of media coverage for these attacks.
28
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/02/06/president-trump-isnow-speculating-that-themedia-is-covering-up-terroristattacks/?utm_term=.b23ffe5a9113
29
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/terrorism-united-states.aspx
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Appendix Table A1. News Coverage by Attack (see Excel spreadsheet)
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=136)

Table 2. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode (N=136)

Table 3. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met
(N=113)

Table 4. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood
(N=134)

Table 5. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met
without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood (N=111)

Figure 1. Percent Increase in Coverage by Attack Attributes and Source Type (N=136)

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Terrorism Episodes when all GTD Terrorism Criteria
Met (N=113)

Table A3. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode, with alternative operationalization of
casualties (N=136)

Table A4. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met,
with alternative operationalization of casualties (N=113)

Table A5. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood,
with alternative operationalization of casualties (N=134)

Table A6. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met
without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood, with alternative operationalization of casualties
(N=111)

Table A7. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode, including measure for known group
affiliation (N=136)

Table A8. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met,
including measure for known group affiliation (N=113)

Table A9. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood,
including measure for known group affiliation (N=134)

Table A10. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met
without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood, including measure for known group affiliation
(N=111)

Table A11. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode – Comparing Major and Non-Major
Media outlets (N=136)

Table A12. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met
– Comparing Major and Non-Major Media outlets (N=113)

Table A13. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood
– Comparing Major and Non-Major Media outlets (N=134)

Table A14. News Coverage by Terrorism Episode when all GTD Terrorism Criteria Met
without Boston Bombing or Fort Hood – Comparing Major and Non-Major Media outlets
(N=131)

